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The existence and collapse of the common ruble area on the territory of the former 
Soviet Union (FSU) in 1992-1993, i.e. already after the dissolution of the Soviet state, 
raised a lot of discussions and controversies among the politicians and experts both inside 
and outside FSU. In the very beginning of the post-Soviet economic transition quite a lot 
of people and institutions (including the International Monetary Fund) believed in the 
possibility to maintain the common currency working for all or at least for part of FSU 
countries.  
Political considerations were one reason for this advocacy. They dominated among 
certain Russian politicians dreaming about rebuilding in some way the former empire or 
at least keeping the special relations with former Soviet republics. The notion of the "near 
abroad" (blizhnee zarubezhie) reflects this philosophy in the best way. However, also 
many leading politicians in FSU countries supported for quite long the idea of the 
common ruble area for various economic and political reasons. Economic support for the 
common ruble area came from the wish not to disrupt the strong trade interrelations 
between the former Soviet republics. At that time the recent experience with the collapse 
of CMEA payment area, in the beginning of 1991, made many Western experts reluctant 
to any radical changes in the trade and payment mechanism on the territory of the FSU. 
Another argument seemed to come from a more general believe in the value of regional 
economic integration. While Western Europe attempts to strengthen its economic and 
political integration, including the establishment of a monetary union with a common 
                                              
1 Section 4-6 of this paper are based on my and Rafał Antczak’s earlier papers [see - Dąbrowski, 1995; 
Dąbrowski and Antczak, 1994). I based the historical part (sections 3 and 4) on a series of interviews with a group of 
Russian economists being actively involved in the transition process. I received the most important information, 
from the former Acting Prime Minister Egor Gaidar, former Deputy Prime Minister and twice Minister of Finance 
Boris Fedorov, former deputies governors of CBRF Dmitrii Tulin and Sergei Ignatiev, former Adviser to Prime 
Minister  Andrei Illarionov and former Member of the Congress of the People’s Deputies Mikhail Dmitrev. I am also 
very grateful to Alan Gelb and Lucjan Orlowski for the very helpful comments to the earlier draft. Of course, I am 
solely responsible for the content and quality of this paper. M. Dąbrowski 
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currency unit in the coming decade, one can observe the opposite process in the Eastern, 
post-communist part of our continent
2. Apart from FSU, the monetary disintegration also 
happened in the former Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia. 
Looking retrospectively, attempts to maintain the common ruble area seem to be 
very naive. Apart from all purely economic arguments about possible advantages of 
keeping the common currency area (which are also not obvious in the case of FSU) they 
missed completely the political realities. The latter were the following: strong political 
consensus in respect to monetary and fiscal targets, the common institution in charge of 
implementing these targets, and some minimum of common legislation (concerning the 
banking and foreign exchange regulations) are absolutely necessary conditions to have a 
common currency. These conditions were not present after dissolution of USSR. 
Moreover, they were not present already in 1991 or even in the end of 1990 when the 
process of monetary disintegration really started.  
Nevertheless, the former Soviet currency - the ruble - was inherited in the first stage 
of independence by all post-Soviet states. This was true for both the nations that became 
members of the CIS in December 1991 and those which chose the path of full political 
separation (i.e. the Baltic states). However, strong disintegration factors began to 
influence the functioning of the monetary system, leading to the partial collapse of the 
monetary union in mid 1992 and the final collapse in the second half of 1993. All political 
attempts inside the CIS to rebuild, at least partly, the ruble zone, including the treaty on 
monetary union between Russia and Belarus failed because of the absence of the above 
mentioned political and institutional preconditions for the existence of a common 
currency.  
This paper has mainly a historical character and analyzes the causes of the monetary 
disintegration of the FSU, stages of this disintegration, and macroeconomic consequences 
of this process. The second section is devoted to a brief discussion of the economic and 
political condition of the successful existence of the common currency area. In section 3,  
                                              
2 It was the case of the author of this paper who also at the end of 1991 supported the continuation of the  
common ruble zone [see - Dąbrowski, 1991] and now sees it as mistake.  The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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I describe the process of monetary disintegration that already started at the end of 1990 
when the Soviet Union still existed. Section 4 illustrates the process of monetary 
disintegration in 1992-1993, after the dissolution of USSR. Section 5 presents a picture 
about the most important initiative to rebuild the ruble area in 1992-1994. Finally, section 
6 contains the discussion on macroeconomic and other consequences of continuing the 
common currency despite the political disintegration.  
 
2. The basic economic and political preconditions of the 
common currency 
 
The rationality of a common currency for a specific territory can be discussed from 
both an economic and political point of view. In each case two questions need to be 
answered: (1) What is the economic justification for the specific territory unit to have a 
common currency?, and (2) Can this territory have common monetary and fiscal policy 
and a common monetary institution?  
The very detailed analysis of these two problems in relation to the former USSR is 
far beyond the planned limits of this paper. However, even a very brief look into the 
former Soviet economy gives the negative answers.  
The economic question can be discussed on the basis of optimal currency area 
theory, first proposed by Mundell [1961] and developed by McKinnon [1963]. Both 
authors made de facto equation between the territory with a single currency and territory 
with many currencies but convertible one to other at the fixed exchange rate. Ronald 
McKinnon [1963, p.717] even wrote that "...a fixed exchange rate system with guaranteed 
convertibility of currencies is almost the same thing as a single currency regime". 
However, both authors missed the problem of transaction costs which still exist under 
fixed exchange rates (even permanently fixed) and do not exist under single currency 
regime.  M. Dąbrowski 
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The problem of the optimal currency area occurs when the specific territory (let say 
A) becomes subject of the supply or demand shock vis a vis other territory (B) changing 
their bilateral terms of trade. The most simple way to adjust to the shock is to change the 
exchange rate between A and B currencies. However, it is possible only if they have 
separate currencies with flexible exchange rate. If not (because both are, for example, the 
regions of the same country) two other forms of adjustment remain: (i) moving of labor 
and capital, or (ii) fiscal transfers.  
First form of adjustment needs a high factor mobility between shock affected 
territories {see - e.g. Orlowski, 1994] what is, for example, the case of United States. 
However, a free mobility of goods, labor and capital never existed in the former Soviet 
economy because the allocation of resources was totally or almost totally a subject of 
central planning and administrative regulation. Significant reallocation of labor under the 
Stalin great industrialization program in 1930s and 1940s was purely administrative 
operation violating the human rights and human dignity. It did not differ from the 
allocation of slaves. Later, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev moving of labor became a 
more ‘human’ with using more material and political stimulation but never abandoning 
completely the administrative measures (such as propiska system). It is hardly to expect 
that after the dissolution of USSR the real free mobility of labor will exist especially when 
ethnic and cultural factors play a greater role. The same ethnic and cultural factors will 
also probably limit capital mobility although more depends here on regulatory framework 
in each newly independent state.  
What concerns the second form of adjustment massive inter-regional fiscal transfers 
are used in many countries such as United States, France, Germany (especially in relation 
to former GDR) but also among countries being members of the European Union. It was 
also the case of the former USSR where the differentiated effects of external shock 
absorption were neutralized by massive fiscal and quasi-fiscal transfers
3 between Soviet 
republics, mainly from Russia to the non-Russian republics [see - Selm and D￿lle, 1993; 
                                              
3 The latter takes the form of price subsidies and/or monetary financing. The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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Orlowski, 1993]
4. This situation was partly continued in 1992 and in the first half of 1993 
[see - Dąbrowski and Antczak, 1994]. However, in mid 1993 Russian authorities decided 
to stop this practice, at least at the previous scale. It brought the real end of the ruble zone 
(see - section 4).  
As we see from above analyzis free factors mobility on the specific territory and its 
potential exposure to the common external shocks are two basic rational criteria to have a 
common currency. If shock is asymmetric and factors mobility limited the affected 
countries have to choices: fiscal redistribution between them or exchange rate adjustment. 
The first method needs at least a kind of political confederation, a second must be 
connected with abandoning the common currency.  
The strong asymmetric exposure of the former USSR to different kind of shocks is 
out of discussion. The reasons of it lie in the enormous differentiation of the industrial 
structure between the former Soviet republics. For example, after the two oil shocks in 
1970s, when Soviet authorities decided not to adjust the domestic energy prices to the 
new world prices, Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan became the main losers, and 
other republics started to receive huge indirect subsidies to their substandard 
manufacturing industries. The situation changed radically when Russia started to adjust 
the oil and gas prices to the world level which happened in 1992-1993. It is worth to 
remember that the oil and gas prices adjustment is not the only one structural challenge 
facing the FSU countries (demilitarization is one of other important issues). It means the 
FSU countries had and still have to adjust to various asymmetric structural shocks.  
The above analyzis becomes a little bit more complicated when we add the problem 
of transaction costs. Without doubts a common decreases this kind of costs [Selm, 1995]. 
It is connected not only with cost of exchange operation but also with the exchange risk 
(if exchange rate is flexible) and additional rigidities if separate currencies are not fully 
convertible. This last kind of risk was specially actual in the discussed case because in 
                                              
4 The similar argumentation can be raised in relation to the Russian Federation today. The capacity to absorb 
external shocks is very differentiated between regions, factors mobility is very limited and therefore strong fiscal  
transfers must be maintained.  M. Dąbrowski 
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1992 or 1993 it was not clear that the new post-Soviet currencies will be at least partly 
convertible
5.  
Transaction costs become an important argument in favor of common currency 
when the share of mutual trade is high [Selm, 1995]. It was probably the main argument 
in favor of continuing the common ruble zone after the dissolution of USSR in the eyes of 
many Western experts including IMF
6. But it was also a crucial interpretation mistake.  
A fairly large dependence of some Soviet republics on the inter-republican trade, 
especially of Belarus and Baltics [see - Selm and Wagener, 1993; Orlowski, 1993] did not 
mean that trade relations were optimal from the point of view of the real comparative 
advantages of each republic or region and should be continued for any price. They 
reflected rather results of arbitrary investment decisions (based on political criteria and 
considerations) and the bargaining process connected with a command system.  
After the dissolution of USSR a significant part of former inter-republican trade 
collapsed not only because of the creation of some trade barriers between FSU countries 
and uncertainty about the payment system. It occurred mainly because most of this trade 
was earlier not rational from the point of view of the microeconomic calculation, 
especially after the energy prices and transportation tariffs were adjusted to world market 
levels. The serious decrease of military and investment demand played an additional role 
here.  
The traditional trade relations collapsed not only between the newly independent 
states (NIS) but also inside them, especially inside Russia. For example, the Moscow or 
St. Petersburg supplier may no longer be the best trade partner for an enterprise located in 
Vladivostok because of the large distance and high transportation costs. The latter may 
                                              
5 In the end of 1995 most of the new currencies are de facto convertible at least in relation to export-import 
operations. It happened partly due to demonstration effect of Central European and Baltic countries, partly due to 
IMF pressure. 
6 With some exceptions. For example, Havrylyshyn and Williamson [1991] belonged to authors who 
underlined the importance of trade dependence between former USSR republics and the negative consequences of 
the  potential trade disruption. However, their conclusions did not stress the necessity to have the common currency 
in the  future as a condition of successful economic co-operation.  The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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prefer in this situation a Japanese, Chinese or Korean partner. From the discussed point of 
view one can raise doubts if Russia alone is the optimal currency area? Very weak 
transportation, communication and legal infrastructure on the largest territory in the 
world, continuation of residency restrictions (propiska), etc., seriously limit interregional 
factor mobility. The actual separation of Moscow financial market from the regional ones 
is only one of many examples. However, I am not going to argue in favor of any kind of 
balkanization of Russia. I only want to draw attention to the role of disintegration factors 
in the former USSR and today’s Russia which did not help and do not help political 
integrity. 
We have arrived at the political conditions of the common currency area. If number 
of independent countries want to have a monetary union they must give up part of their 
sovereignty - at least in the monetary, fiscal and trade policy spheres, they should agree 
on the common banking and foreign exchange legislation, remove barriers on goods, 
labor and capital mobility, they should be ready to accept the inter-state fiscal transfers in 
case of locally absorbed external shocks.  
It is absolutely clear that such political conditions never existed after the dissolution 
of the USSR. The political sovereignty became an important autonomous value
7 and a lot 
of mistrust and even suspiciousness existed in relation between non-Russian republics and 
Russia or between some neighbouring republics (with Armenia and Azerbaijan relations 
as the most extreme case). The political instability and immaturity of new democratic 
institutions have not helped to build any long term agreement around the questions seen 
as elementary preconditions to have a common currency.  
What is even more interesting and important, the political condition necessary for 
the effective monetary union did not exist already in the last years of the USSR, before its 
formal dissolution.  
 
                                              
7 Havrylyshyn and Williamson [1991, p. 6] quote an opinion of Harry G. Johnson [1968] that "...nationalist 
symbols have value to societies, which should be free to trade off a certain amount of economic efficiency for their 
acquisition ". M. Dąbrowski 
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3. The first stage of monetary disintegration - Russia's 
economic war with the Soviet Union (1990-1991). 
 
The Mikhail Gorbachev glasnost’ and perestroika bring more political freedom and 
less administrative and police repression in the former Soviet Union at the end of the 
1980s. It led, among many other political and economic effects, to the renaissance of 
independence movements among some nations living in the Soviet empire. The Baltic 
republics were the leaders in this movement. Here also the first ideas of republican 
economic autonomy and republican oriented economic reforms were presented. In 1988 
the pro-independence Sajudis movement in Lithuania proposed a comprehensive 
economic reform package oriented, among others, to the greater republican autonomy 
[Samonis, 1995]. The future republican central bank and republican currency were the 
integral component of this proposal.  
A similar intellectual concept named as the New Economic Mechanism (Estonian 
acronym IME) was proposed by a group of Estonian economists in 1987 and 1988 [see - 
Lainela and Sutela, 1995; Dąbrowski, 1989]. Both republics started to build gradually 
their future central banks not abandoning in the same time the republican branches of the 
State Bank of USSR (Gosbank). However, some conflicts around credit emission between 
both republics and the central Soviet authorities were observed already in 1989 and 1990. 
In Latvia the intention to introduce its national currency was announced first time in 1990 
only [Lainela and Sutela, 1995]. In the same year Latvia started to build the institution of 
its central bank.  
Although Mikhail Gorbachev and other members of the top Soviet leadership were 
not ready at that time to accept the independence of the Baltic republics
8 they did not 
                                              
8 Very nervous reaction of the top Soviet leadership after the Lithuanian declaration of independence in 
March 1990 was the best example. Moscow imposed various economic sanctions against Lithuania, including 
stopping the delivery of oil and oil products.  The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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oppose openly to the idea of stronger republican economic autonomy including separate 
republican currencies. It probably reflected the lack of understanding of the political 
implications of such an autonomy and more generally - the lack of idea how to reform the 
Soviet economy.  
As far as striving for greater economic independence concerned only the Baltic 
republics, it did not present a real threat to the integrity of Soviet monetary and fiscal 
policies. It looks like a big historical paradox, but the decisive attack against the Soviet 
economic and political unity came from Russia. In the spring of 1990 the new parliament
9 
of the Russian Federation elected Boris Yeltsin as its speaker - at that time also the formal 
head of the Russian Federation. Yeltsin who was the former member of Politburo of the 
Central Committee of CPSU and former First Secretary of the Moscow party organization 
was seen at that time as the main challenger to Mikhail Gorbachev. He gained a support 
of the Russian democratic movement which wanted to go beyond the limited perestroika 
reforms.  
The declaration of sovereignty of the Russian Federation from June 12, 1990 was 
the first major step towards the disintegration of USSR taken by the new Russian 
parliament. It was followed by similar declarations of other Soviet republics and 
sometimes even by the lower level territorial units. Russian declaration of sovereignty 
contained also some general statement about its own monetary system. The declaration 
alone did not have a direct and immediate impact on monetary and fiscal policies. 
However, the logic of political struggle between Russian and Soviet authorities had to 
lead to more serious consequences sooner or later. 
                                              
9 Mikhail Gorbachev decided to organize in March 1990 democratic elections to republican supreme soviets 
as well as to council (soviets) on the oblast’, raion and city levels. The quality of the democratic election procedures 
varied across republics and regions of USSR but generally 1990 elections gave more independent legislatives on 
each level of government (a year earlier a partly democratic elections to the Congress of the People Deputies and 
Supreme Soviet of USSR took place). It was the most decisive impulse to the political emancipation of most of the 
Soviet republics. M. Dąbrowski 
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Before I describe the process of economic warfare between Russia and the Soviet 
authorities it is worth to say what was the rational of this conflict. What targets the new 
Russian authorities and elites wanted to achieve?  
Answering this question is not an easy task. The real political developments at that 
time seemed to be influenced by a number of different factors. The political and personal 
rivalry between Yeltsin and Gorbachev was only one of them. Yeltsin was not the only 
Russian political figure presenting strong personal ambitions. The same characteristics 
were also attributable to his deputy in parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov who later became 
one of the main actors of the September - October 1993 drama. Russian democratic 
movement (Democratic Russia - Demrossiya) became more and more disappointed with 
the inconsequent Gorbachev reforms and made its political choice in favor of Yeltsin. Part 
of the Russian democratic activists consciously accepted the perspective of independence 
of some of the Soviet republics when others believed in the possibility to build the 
renewed Soviet Union. Some of the liberal minded economists were aware of the huge 
costs connected with continuation of the Soviet federation and the common currency area 
and it was for this reason that they did not oppose the perspective of economic 
disintegration of USSR. They also did not believe in the possibility to find a rational 
consensus in respect to the reform program for all the Soviet republics whose economic 
interests were strongly differentiated. 
Unfortunately, economic disintegration of USSR happened in a very spontaneous 
manner, a manner of populist struggle between Russian and Soviet authorities. It led to 
the total lose of macroeconomic control and repressed hyperinflation in the very end of 
1991. Before it happened Russian parliament and government started to decompose the 
old economic order through unilateral legislative decisions.  
The Law on the Central Bank of Russian Federation and Law on Banks and Banking 
Activity from December 1990 were the first concrete steps on this path [see - Matycyn, 
1994]. The newly created Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBRF) with Georgii 
Matyukhin as governor began to take over the personal and administrative control over all 
regional branches of the Gosbank of USSR on the Russian territory. It also offered more 
liberal licensing conditions for commercial banks. As a result of this competition most The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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commercial banks in the Russian Federation were re-registered under the jurisdiction of 
CBRF in the next few months. The Russian central bank did not respect the Gosbank 
recommendations and decisions in relation to credit emission, interest rate policy, reserve 
requirements, etc. It started to finance the republican budget deficit and Russian 
enterprises through fully autonomous credit emission.  
The monetary and banking war was followed by a similar war in the fiscal policy 
sphere. Russian government started to consolidate control over all-union enterprises, on 
its territory, offering them lower tax rates. Collected taxes were used for the republican 
budget purposes and not transmitted to the Union budget. This practice was followed later 
by some other republics. In 1991 the Union budget (especially in the second half of the 
year) was left without revenues and with the expenditure side only (The Union level still 
financed the army and security forces, central administration, some subsidies, and 
investments, etc.). It led, of course, to the uncontrolled monetary expansion as Gosbank 
had to finance huge deficit of the Union budget.  
The Russian parliament and government also competed with Soviet authorities on 
the social policy field multiplying various social privileges and benefits. This populist 
competition was additionally stimulated by the political events - the Spring 1991 
referendum on continuation of Soviet Union
10 and June 1991 presidential elections in 
Russia won by Boris Yeltsin. This last event led to August 1991 coup d’Øtat.  
The Soviet government of Valentin Pavlov tried desperately to improve the 
macroeconomic equilibrium by the non-equivalent exchange of 50- and 100-ruble 
banknotes in January 1991 and by the administrative price increase in April 1991. Both 
steps were taken from the traditional command economy arsenal and not accompanied by 
any more comprehensive reform measures. Additionally, the first decision was badly 
calculated and implemented, only increasing economic chaos.  
The unsuccessful, August 1991, coup d’Øtat became the turning point in the late 
history of Soviet Union, leading to its final dissolution in December 1991. It was a 
                                              
10 This referendum was formally won by Mikhail Gorbachev - most of electorate voted in favor of renewed 
Soviet Union. The result of referendum could not stop, however, the disintegration process.  M. Dąbrowski 
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desperate attempt taken by the communist party hardliners (including the V-President 
Yanaev, Prime Minister Pavlov, Minister of Defence Yazov, KGB Chief Kryuchkov and 
Supreme Soviet Speaker Lukiyanov) to save the Soviet empire and prevent the signing of 
a new Union Treaty finalizing the negotiations in Novo-Ogarevo. From today’s point view 
it is quite clear that the coup d’Øtat was planned not only against Gorbachev and the most 
nationally emancipated Soviet republics such as the Baltic republics and Georgia but also 
or even mainly against Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Federation authorities.  
The failure of the August coup accelerated the process of political and economic 
disintegration. The last Soviet administration - Interrepublican Economic Committee 
(Mezhrespublikanskii Ekonomicheskii Komitet - MEK) headed by Ivan Silaev - played 
the role of a liquidation committee rather than of a real government. A strong effort to 
prepare and negotiate with Soviet republics a new Treaty on Economic Union was taken 
by the MEK V-Chairman Grigorii Yavlinskii but it did not end successfully. The concept 
of the treaty tried to follow the idea of the European Union including a monetary and 
banking union [see - opinion of Havrylyshyn and Williamson, 1991]. The treaty was 
signed in Novo-Ogarevo in October 1991 by 10 republics but never implemented because 
of a failure to agree on the political union treaty. The Economic Union treaty was the first 
from a very long list of integration agreements signed during the next three years between 
the former Soviet republics. These treaties reflected only some political declaration’s and 
a lot of economic illusions but never real readiness to return to any kind of political union 
which is the necessary condition to have a common currency.  
Real developments went in a completely opposite direction. After August 1991, 
Gosbank of USSR definitely lost control over monetary policy in Russia and Baltic states 
which became recognized as independent by Russia and the Soviet Union. Most other 
republics preferred more passive approach waiting for the final outcome of this conflict.  
The Ukrainian referendum from December 1, 1991 accepting the independence of 
this country led to Belavezha agreements on dissolution of the USSR and creating the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In mid December the decision on the 
liquidation of Gosbank of USSR was taken by President Yeltsin. The ruble zone entered The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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the new stage of its existence when the one common currency was managed by 15 central 
banks each one of them being independent.  
 
4. The Second stage of monetary disintegration - after 
dissolution of USSR (1992-1993) 
 
From the beginning of 1992 all of the former Soviet republics became independent 
states having their own central banks. However, all these countries (including Baltic ones) 
used in the beginning of their independence the old Soviet ruble. For the reasons 
discussed earlier this situation was not sustainable and had to evolve. Taking into 
consideration a general reluctance to rebuild the political union the only possible outcome 
in the monetary sphere could be the collapse of a common currency area. It had to happen 
sooner or later. In reality this process took almost two years. Without going into details
11, 
we can identify four distinct phases of that process: 
The first phase consisted of the functioning of a monetary union in the first half of 
1992, with 15 national banks acting as central banks, independent of each other and using 
their positions as ￿free riders￿
12 to try to outbid each other in the emission of money in the 
form of credit. The National Bank of the Ukraine was particularly active on this front, 
being the first central bank in the former USSR to initiate (in June 1992) so-called 
vzaimozachet, that is, multilateral clearing of interenterprise arrears with the help of an 
additional supply of credit. Although Russia became a monopolist in the emission of ruble 
                                              
11 A detailed description of this process can be found, for example, in Dąbrowski et al. [1993], Hernandez-
Cata [1993], Dąbrowski [1993], Granville and Lushin [1993], and IMF [1994]. 
12 The above described system created total anarchy in the monetary policy. One must agree with Jeffrey 
Sachs and David Lipton that "...there is no realistic possibility of controlling credit in a system in which several 
independent central banks each have the independent authority to issue credit. The reason is simple. There is an 
overwhelming pressure in each of the states to "free ride" by issuing ruble credits at the expense of the rest of the 
system" [Sachs and Lipton, 1992]. The effect was similar to the case of falsification of banknotes, maybe even more 
serious because it is far easier from technical point of view to issue additional credit money than cash money.  M. Dąbrowski 
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cash, some other republics of the former USSR began to introduce parallel cash currency 
(coupons) avoiding in this way Russian constraints and "protecting" the domestic 
consumer markets (with continuing shortages) against buyers from other republics. This 
was the case, for example, in the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Azerbaijan. 
The vastly expansive monetary policy in several post-Soviet states (in some cases 
even more expansive than in Russia) as well as the traditional structural imbalance in 
interrepublican trade in favor of Russia (financed in the past by enormous capital transfers 
from the budget of the USSR) caused an enormous "import" of money in credit form by 
Russia in 1992 and the first half of 1993 (see - section 6). 
The second phase began with the CBRF’s introduction at the beginning of July 
1992 of the requirement of daily bilateral clearing of settlements between Russia and 
other post-Soviet states still using the ruble. Payments made by these states to Russia 
were realized only in the amount in the correspondence account of a given central bank 
with the CBRF on a given day. This step meant in practice the end of the ruble as a 
uniform currency in non-cash settlements and the creation of national non-cash rubles. In 
practice this fundamental turning point in the monetary system was "softened" until 
spring of 1993 by the abundant supply of so-called technical credits for the states of the 
CIS from the CBRF and the Russian government. This meant Russia’s continuing import 
of inflation from other post-Soviet states (chiefly Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus). 
In cash turnover the ruble remained a common currency, although the use of monetary 
substitutes (coupons) expanded due to Russia’s rationing of deliveries of ruble cash. This 
last fact resulted in turn from the increase, in the first half of 1993, in payment for imports 
from Russia using ruble cash, given the existing limits on technical credits. 
In the third phase, various post-Soviet states exited completely from the ruble area 
by introducing their own national currencies. This process began at the end of June 1992 
in Estonia; Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine followed in the summer and autumn of 1992, and 
Kyrgyzstan in May 1993. 
The fourth phase was the final collapse of the ruble area, which began with the 
exchange of banknotes by the CBRF on Russian territory at the end of July 1993. After 
several months of political bargaining over the idea of creating a so-called "new style The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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ruble area" (see Granville and Lushin [1993] and section 5 of the present paper), all 
remaining post-Soviet states introduced their own currencies. This occurred during the 
period from September to November 1993. The exception was Tadzhikistan, which 
introduced its own currency not until May 1995.  
Table 1 contains a list of the new national currencies and dates of their introduction. 
If we look at the motivation staying behind the individual decisions to leave a ruble 
area it varied across the FSU countries. Some of them (Baltics states, Ukraine) decided to 
introduce their own currencies mainly for political reasons: they wanted to get 
sovereignty also in the sphere of monetary policy. But economic arguments also played 
an important role. Russian monetary policy in 1992 and 1993 was too inflationary for 
Baltic states which wanted to stabilize their economies very quickly (especially Estonia 
and Latvia). It seems that the same argument played a role in Kyrgyzstan. Contrary to it, 
for Ukraine and Belarus Russian monetary policy was too restrictive - they wanted to 
issue even more money than they can expect from CBRF. The last group which left the 
ruble area in autumn 1993 (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Moldova, Armenia 
and Georgia) was simply pushed out from this zone through CBRF operation exchanging 




                                              
13 The goal of this operation was not, however, completely clear and were never explicitly stated by its 
authors. The behavior of the CBRF was not very consistent, as is shown by the almost immediate transfer of 50 
billion ruble of new banknotes to Uzbekistan. Thus, another interpretation cannot be ruled out _ that in essence the 
leadership of the CBRF wanted to throw the other states of the CIS on their knees in order to make them more 
willing to submit to rejoin the ruble area on the conditions set by the CBRF. If this is the case, then this goal was not 
attained. Regardless of the intentions underlying the decision of the CBRF, the operation of exchanging banknotes 
had many negative indirect effects on the monetary system in Russia itself.  M. Dąbrowski 
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5. Unsuccessful attempts to rebuild ruble area (1992-1994) 
From the very beginning of the process of the ruble area’s gradual disintegration, 
endeavors had also been under way to preserve it and then, after partial collapse in 1992, 
to recreate it.  
The history of efforts to preserve or reanimate the ruble area includes a number of 
agreements signed at a series of summits of CIS states; in general, these were not very 
concrete and lacked any effective implementation mechanisms. In the meantime, the real 
course of events tended in exactly the opposite direction: gradual disintegration. Thus, all 
the monetary and banking agreements were never implemented.  
Chronologically the first document of this type was the "Agreement on a Uniform 
Monetary System and Unified Money, Credit, and Currency Policy in the States Using the 
Ruble as a Legal Medium of Exchange," signed October 9, 1992 during a CIS summit 
meeting in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek by eight states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tadzhikistan, and Uzbekistan) [see Gurevich, 1992] 
14. 
This agreement called, among other things, for the preservation of the ruble as a common 
legal medium of exchange (although at the same time it allowed for the continued 
existence of monetary surrogates, and thus did not exclude the possibility of the 
signatories’ introducing their own currencies in the future). Decision mechanisms were 
also not precisely defined which would have made it possible to conduct a common and 
effective monetary and fiscal policy. 
In Bishkek it was also decided to create an Interstate Bank (Mezhgosudarstvennyi 
bank), whose "task of first priority" was to be the "...realization of mutual interstate 
settlements." It was not clear, however, whether this was to be the central emission bank 
of the ruble area or only a bank for multilateral clearing; the relation of the bank to the 
republican banks was also not clear. The internal decision mechanism of the bank became 
a subject of conflict between the signatories of the Bishkek agreement. Russia wanted a 
                                              
14 The earlier CIS central banks summit in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) in spring 1992 did not bring any concrete 
decisions.  The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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quota system modelled after the IMF, which would obviously have given it the decisive 
say. The other partners preferred the principle of one country, one vote, which in turn was 
not acceptable for Russia. 
The latter problem (the character and method of management of the Interstate Bank) 
became the subject of three-month-long negotiations by experts and politicians. Finally, at 
the next CIS summit in Minsk in January 1993, it was agreed that the Interstate Bank 
would be an institution organizing multilateral clearing on the basis of the Russian ruble. 
Russia received 50 percent of the votes in the Board of the bank; the majority of 
decisions, however, were to require 75 percent of the votes for approval [see Zhagel’, 
1993; Seninsky, 1993; SNG, 1993]. 
In practice, the Interstate Bank never came into being, in spite of repeated political 
declarations of the need for its existence. Thus, for example, at the CIS summit in 
Moscow on May 14, 1993, a new document, the Economic Union Treaty [see - 
Kozarzewski, 1994], was signed. It affirmed the earlier agreement concerning the 
Interstate Bank and the intention to preserve the common currency (the ruble). 
On the basis of this treaty negotiations concerning the "New Style Ruble Area" 
(NSRA) were conducted (although no one ever defined how NSRA was to differ from the 
"old" one). A "mobilizing" factor was undoubtedly constituted by the July ruble 
exchange, which, in states still officially using the old banknotes, caused a massive flight 
from the currency. The next agreement concerning the NSRA, signed September 7, 1993, 
by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Belarus, and Armenia, included an 
agreement concerning the coordination of monetary, fiscal, banking, and currency 
regulations (an agreement to maintain stable exchange rates of the national currencies 
versus the ruble). Indicators to be set by Russia included; the money supply, consolidated 
budget deficit, interest rates on central bank refinancing credit, and the minimum reserve 
requirements. 
This agreement opened bilateral negotiations between CIS states and Russia. The 
next step involved signing the standardized bilateral agreements between Russia and the 
above-named states. The agreements stated that at the conclusion of the period of 
transformation into the NSRA, the ruble was to be the only legal medium of exchange in M. Dąbrowski 
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the signatory countries. These countries also expressed agreement to a unified exchange 
rate of the ruble against convertible countries and the creation of common international 
reserves for the purpose of defending the ruble. The indicated date for the conclusion of 
the transformation period (completion of appropriate legal regulations and coordination 
with Russia of monetary and fiscal policy) was the end of 1994. However, also this 
agreement was never implemented. In spite of the signing in the autumn of 1993 of 
bilateral framework agreements by the signatories of the NSRA agreement, these states 
were forced in October and November 1993 to introduce national monetary units, in cash 
as well as non-cash turnover. They were induced to do so by their populations’ flight from 
the old Soviet rubles, the technical cash deficit and the firm position of the Russian 
government (controlled in this period by the radical reformers) in the matter of conditions 
of realization of the monetary union. These conditions would have led to the complete 
surrender of sovereignty in the sphere of macroeconomic policy and the banking system 
and the assumption of demanding obligations in the matter of internal financial discipline. 
The last serious attempt to rebuild, at least partly the ruble area, was the "Agreement 
on the Unification of the Monetary Systems of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian 
Federation and on the Conditions of Functioning of a Common Monetary System" from 
April 12, 1994. Belarus tried to use the political changes in Moscow at the beginning of 
1994 (resignation of Egor Gaidar and Boris Fedorov from government) to realize the idea 
of the NSRA.  
The signed document called for a number of far-reaching steps to harmonize the 
economic systems of those two countries. The most important were the following:  
1.  on May 1, 1994, Belarus was to adjust all its customs duties and taxes affecting 
foreign trade to those prevailing in Russia as of April 1, 1994; tariffs in mutual trade 
were to be eliminated, and at the moment of the monetary union’s going into effect, 
quotas and licenses in bilateral trade contacts of the two nations were also to be 
eliminated; 
2.  Belarus was to cease collection of payments and transit taxes on Russian exports and 
imports and also in the case of transit to and from the Kaliningrad oblast’; Russian The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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strategic forces stationed on Belarussian territory were to be freed from tax and 
payment obligations to the Belarussian authorities; 
3.  the common monetary unit was to be the Russian ruble and the CBRF was to be the 
central bank within the union; the role of the National Bank of Belarus was to play 
the role of a branch of the CBRF, with representatives of the NBB included in the 
Council of Directors of the CBRF; 
4.  at the moment of the agreement’s going into effect, the citizens of Belarus were to be 
obliged to exchange 200 thousand Belarussian rubles in cash and up to one million 
Belarussian rubles in the form of bank deposits and savings certificates (held as of 
April 1, 1994) for Russian rubles at the rate of 1:1 (the market rate in spring 1994 
was around 10:1); the exchange ceiling was to be indexed with respect to inflation in 
Russia (based on the CPI) for the period from April 12, 1994 to the moment of the 
exchange; the remaining funds of individual persons and of enterprises were to be 
exchanged at a special rate reflecting the purchasing power parity relationship as 
well as the market rate and agreed upon by the authorities of both countries; 
5.  Russia was to make efforts to extend to Belarus in the first quarter of 1994 state 
credit for the support of the balance of payments in the amount of 200 billion 
Russian rubles; 
6.  both countries were to strictly harmonize their budgetary systems, which in practice 
means that the Belarussian budget was to be accepted by the government of the 
Russian Federation and the Russian Duma; 
7.  within three months following the currency unification, Belarus was to adopt the 
Russian system of wages and salaries for employees in the budgetary sphere, and 
social and employment policies were to become subject to joint coordination. 
Undoubtedly, the Russian - Belarusian treaty was the most concrete agreement 
concluded for the purpose of bringing about a return to a common currency on at least a 
portion of the territory of the former USSR. However, it was never ratified and 
implemented. Belarus did not want to give up the independence of its central bank which 
would violate the Belarussian constitution. After presidential election in summer 1993 the M. Dąbrowski 
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new President Aleksandr Lukashenko decided de facto to abandon this agreement. Only 
the first two points (on custom union and on transit issues) were implemented. 
Looking at the quite long history of unsuccessful attempts to reconstruct, at least 
partly, the ruble area it is worth to ask what kind of motives and arguments stood behind 
them.  
These motives were quite obvious in the case of some CIS leaders outside Russia 
who struggled to the very end for retaining the ruble zone. They represent countries 
heavily benefiting from Russian financial aid in the past. They believed that remaining in 
the ruble zone they can continue the inter-republican economic relation from the late 
USSR period: large fiscal or quasi-fiscal transfers, unlimited deliveries of cheap energy 
and raw materials, easy market for their substandard manufactured products (or military 
equipment). All these expectations were not realistic.  
Beside the purely economic expectations the political motives played also an 
important role. It was absolutely clear in the case of the two most active advocates of 
rebuilding the ruble area - Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev and Belarusian 
Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich. Nazarbaev was afraid of a conflict between the native 
population and the Russian (or more generally - Slavic) population in case of a definitive 
economic separation of Kazakhstan and Russia. Kebich wanted to win presidential 
election in June 1994 presenting the citizens the perspective of reaching Russia’s living 
standard (which was higher than Belarusian at that time) with the reintroduction the 
Russian ruble. He also treated the monetary union as the substitute of radical market 
reforms and necessary macroeconomic adjustment [see - Dąbrowski, 1994]. 
On the Russian side the main advocates of preservation and later reconstruction of 
the ruble area were conservative and moderately conservative forces interested at least 
partly in the reconstruction of the old empire and taking no note of the financial costs of 
such an arrangement for Russia (see - Kozarzewski, 1994). Among the highest state 
functionaries supporting the ruble area in 1992-1993 were CBRF President Victor The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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Gerashchenko and Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
15. The opponents included 
almost all politicians and economists in the camp of the radical reformers, such as Egor 
Gaidar, Boris Fedorov, Anatolii Chubais, Aleksandr Shokhin and Vladimir Mashits (the 
head of the State Committee on Economic Cooperation with the States of the CIS) who 
understood the economic costs for Russia connected with keeping the common currency. 
The arguments most frequently used by the Russian advocates of the ruble zone are 
the problems of Russian populations in countries of the "near abroad" and the links 
between Russian enterprises and enterprises in the other states of the CIS (which causes 
them to lobby for the preservation of very easy markets).  
Finally it is important to remind that advocates of quick introduction of separate 
national currencies never received clear support from the Western governments and IMF, 
at least in the first year of the post-Soviet transition. Especially the IMF approach to this 
issue was very confusing. During the Tashkent summit of governors of CIS central banks 
in the spring of 1992 the IMF representative did not give a recommendation to introduce 
national currencies but opted rather for the more close co-ordination of macroeconomic 
policies between countries of the ruble zone (which was politically unrealistic). Estonia 
introduced its own currency in June 1992 without prior IMF assistance. Lithuania waited 
with its monetary reform until June 1993 not receiving earlier the necessary support from 
IMF for such a step. It costed this country one year delay in macroeconomic stabilization 
in comparison to its Baltic neighbours. Only in 1993 IMF started its support for the 
introduction of national currencies in FSU countries (Kyrgyzstan was the first case in 




                                              
15 In the very end of negotiations with Belarus in the spring of 1994 Chernomyrdin’s attitude to bilateral 
monetary union became less enthusiastic. It seems that he finally understood the cost of this operation for Russia. M. Dąbrowski 
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6. Economic consequences of maintaining the ruble area. 
The existence of time-lag between the disintegration of the political system and 
abandoning the common currency in the former USSR had an exceptionally unfavorable 
effect on the tempo and quality of macroeconomic stabilization and systemic reforms in 
the FSU states and especially in the Russian Federation. 
This lag caused enormous transfers of Russian GDP to other post-Soviet states in 
1992-1993. The first channel of this transfer was the excessively easy (in the first half of 
1992) financing of imports from Russia, which was gradually rendered more difficult 
until it was finally almost completely brought to a halt in the second half of 1993. The 
second form of transfers consists of artificially low export prices of Russian raw materials 
and energy resources. These are either domestic Russian prices or prices which are in fact 
higher than the domestic prices but still below world prices [see - Antczak, 1994]. The 
third and final form of support for certain states of the CIS is the tolerance of enormous 
payments arrears of those customers to Russian suppliers (particularly with regard to the 
fuel-energy complex). In the remaining part of the analysis we will concentrate primarily 
on the first form of transfers. 
The monetary system as it functioned in the first half of 1992 created - for obvious 
reasons - huge opportunities for the states of the CIS to import Russian goods. Russian 
exporters also profited from this situation. The explosion of mutual arrears of Russian 
enterprises made export to the countries of the former USSR exceptionally attractive. 
Importers of Russian goods thus had easy access to cheap credits granted by the various 
central banks. If we add to this the obvious political motives (the desire to maintain 
Russian influence and presence in various states), we obtain an almost full picture of the 
reasons why the system was preserved in spite of its strongly negative consequences for 
the Russian economy.  
It is worth mentioning that in the first months of the Russian transformation (that is, 
the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992), the threat associated with this type of monetary The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
                                                   CASE Foundation  27
system was not very noticeable either for the Russian reformers or for the IMF and a 
number of foreign experts. It became clear only in the spring of 1992
16. 
The system of daily monitoring of correspondence accounts of the central banks of 
the CIS states established by the CBRF on 1 July, 1992, made possible the control of 
bilateral balances and the imposition of credit limitations. Purchases of goods in Russia 
resulted in liabilities on the correspondence accounts and export to Russia was to balance 
those accounts. Intergovernmental contracts were to regulate the amount of Russia’s 
credits granted to the FSU countries (so-called technical credit of CBRF to other central 
banks). Exceeding the allowable amount of credit resulted in the CBRF’s refusal to 
finance further Russian exports to the state exceeding its limit. A state’s positive balance 
of trade with Russia did not allow it to use its surplus for the financing of trade with any 
third state. Thus, correspondence accounts were strictly bilateral. In spite of strong 
institutional limitations (in comparison with the earlier situation), these regulations were 
very ineffective because of huge expansion of technical credits of CBRF and its 
acceptation of overdrafts on the correspondent accounts in the second half of 1992 and 
the first half of 1993. The sum of these credits for all of 1992 amounted to 1,258 million 
rubles, i.e. 8.4% of Russian GDP according to Granville and Lushin [1993] (see table 2) 
or 1,489 million rubles (8.2% of GDP) according to later estimations [IEA, 1995, pp. 210-
211]. In 1993 the total amount of CBRF credits to FSU countries was equal to 4,852 
million rubles, i.e. 3.0% of GDP [IEA, 1995, pp. 210-211]. However, most of them were 
concentrated in the first half of 1993
17. 
In the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993 the countries of the CIS, desiring to avoid 
a deficit of credit rubles, began to use cash rubles in their trade with Russia. The growth 
of cash deliveries from the CBRF at that period became the main source of financial 
transfers to the countries of the CIS (see - tables 2 and 3).  
                                              
16 Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton [1992] memo from May 1, 1992 was one of the first warnings to Russian 
government. 
17 According to IEA [1995, pp. 222-223] estimates during four months from December 1992 to March 1993 
they amounted 9.5% of Russian GDP, from April to August 1993 3.2% of GDP and in the last four months of 1993 
only 1.5% of GDP.  M. Dąbrowski 
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Due to the lack of hope of credits repayment, the Russian government and the 
Supreme Soviet decided in mid 1993 to suspend further grants and transform the credits 
of 1992-1993 into official state debts of the CIS states to Russia.  
As it was said earlier at the end of November 1993, all nations of the former USSR, 
with the exception of Tadzhikistan, introduced their own currencies. Direct transfers to 
the states of the CIS were seriously limited, and the "monetary" channel for these 
transfers was terminated. In 1994 CBRF credits to FSU countries were practically equal 
zero [IEA, 1995, p. 210-211]. 
In 1992-1993 credit to FSU countries became an important source of the monetary 
expansion of the CBRF (see - table 4). This kind of monetary financing amounted to 
22.3% of the overall CBRF credit increase in 1992 and 21.6% in 1993. It is worth to 
remember that central bank credit expansion exceeded at that time (especially in 1992) 
any international standards.  
For several CIS states, the financial transfers from the CBRF equalled a significant 
portion of their GDP, in 1992 as well as in the first half of 1993 (see table 5). In the case 
of Uzbekistan they amounted to 69.2 percent of the country’s GDP in 1992 and 52.8 
percent in the first seven months of 1993. For Kazakhstan the transfers represented 
respectively 25.1 percent and 40.9 percent of GDP, for Turkmenistan 67.1 percent and 
45.7 percent, for Tadzhikistan 42.3 percent and 40.9 percent, for Armenia 53.2 percent 
and 19.7 percent. Moreover, this accounting does not include indirect transfers resulting 
from artificially low prices of Russian raw materials (especially energy resources). On the 
other hand, serious doubts exist about the accuracy of GDP estimates in the various 
countries. It seems that in many cases they are too low, although this is due to the 
difference between the purchasing power parity of the Russian ruble in various post-
Soviet countries and in Russia itself. Thus the data contained in table 4 should be 
regarded only as rough estimates and not a precise picture of the situation. 
While negative macroeconomic consequences of continuing the ruble area for 
Russia were quite obvious they were less recognized in relation to other FSU countries. 
However, they existed without any doubts. First, highly inflationary environment created 
by the continued monetary union did not allow non-Russian FSU states to stabilize their The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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economies. It is not an accident that progress in fighting with high inflation came in many 
FSU countries only when they left the ruble area. It relates to Baltic states, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, recently to Kazakhstan, Armenia and Georgia. No country was able to stabilize 
while remaining in the ruble area! Second, macroeconomic stabilization under the 
continued ruble area also was not possible because the existing monetary regime was seen 
by economic agents and population as only transitional. Uncertainty decreased the 
propensity to hold the ruble. Third, the availability of almost unlimited Russian financial 
transfers connected with the existence of the common currency slowed down the process 
of structural adjustment and institutional, market-oriented reforms.  
There is quite obvious relation between the state of economy and readiness of 
politicians to implement a socially painful and politically risky reforms. If politicians see 
the possibility to survive without doing fundamental reforms they usually try to avoid or 
postpone such measures. They are ready to start radical changes only if they do not see 
any other way out. It is an unpleasant but true statement about the political economy of 
transition.  
From this point of view keeping the ruble area after political dissolution of USSR 
and, what is even more important, maintaining the illusions about a possibility to return to 
a common currency delayed the transition process in most of FSU countries and made it 
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7. Conclusions 
The history of collapse of the ruble area seems to be a very good empirical lesson 
both for economic theory and economic policy. It highlights the role of political 
consensus and institutionalized political union as the basic precondition to have a 
common currency. If this condition does not exist there is no sense to have a common 
currency even if the specific territory meets the economic criteria of the optimal currency 
area. It is worth repeating, however, that the former USSR could hardly be seen as 
optimal currency area.  
Unfortunately, at the end of 1991 when USSR was politically dissolved most 
politicians and economists in the successor countries failed to make adequate diagnosis in 
relation to monetary arrangements
18. They did not receive also the adequate intellectual 
assistance to solve this problem from the West, especially from the IMF.  
It seems that false diagnosis was not a matter of professional ignorance, especially in 
the case of international financial institutions such as IMF. It rather reflected the political 
confusion after the sudden collapse of the USSR which was not expected to happen so 
fast. Western governments were not generally prepared to deal with 15 completely 
independent post-Soviet states and probably they did not believe that some of them can 
solve their problems themselves without any kind of Russian protectorate. They were also 
afraid of chaotic fragmentation of the Soviet empire which might lead to bloody ethnic 
conflicts and losening control over nuclear weapon
19. Some of the Western politicians did 
                                              
18 Looking at two other disintegration experience in the post-communist part of Europe we can notice similar 
problems in the former Yugoslavia when the new national currencies were introduced in successor countries with 
some delay comparing to the real political dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Contrary to it, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia made separation of their currencies just one month after the dissolution of the Czecho-Slovak 
federation which allowed both countries to avoid macroeconomic turbulences.  
19 Yugoslav civil war which started in mid 1991 and Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
were seen probably by many Western politicians as warning signal what can happen after spontaneous 
decomposition of the former USSR. Another question is did they take the proper lessons from the Yugoslav 
experience. Looking back from today point of view it seems quite obvious that US support for the Yugoslav The reasons for the Collapse of the Ruble Zone 
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not want to provoke a counterreaction of communist hardliners by supporting the idea of 
the breakup of the USSR too early. Later there was also no clear idea about the future 
character of CIS both inside and outside of the FSU.  
Western governments were also afraid of the succession of their financial claims vis 
a vis former USSR and it was an additional reason for preferring to maintain a monetary 
and economic union on the territory of the former USSR [see - Dąbrowski and Rostowski, 
1995].  
Some of FSU and Western economists seemed to overestimate the negative 
consequences of collapse of the monetary union. They assumed that maintaining the 
common currency avoids a trade shock - this was an incorrect diagnosis. A significant 
part of previous trade links would have collapsed anyway regardless whether the ruble 
area continued to exist (as it happened inside Russia). The only real cost of abandoning 
the common currency was connected with higher transaction costs. But it should be 
compared with costs of maintaining unsustainable monetary arrangements which were far 
bigger. 
Prolonging the process of dissolution of the ruble area significantly raised the costs 
of all the USSR’s successors: Russia failed two macrostabilizations (in 1992 and 1993) 
and some other FSU countries delayed the start of real market transition for two years or 
more.  
                                                                                                                                                    
federation to the very end (i.e. summer 1991) was a serious mistake strengthening de facto Serbian imperialistic 
ambitions.  M. Dąbrowski 
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Table 1: Timetable of introduction the new currencies by FSU countries 
Country  Date of the full 
separation from 




Estonia   06/22/1992  Kroon Currency board, with peg to the German mark 
Latvia  07/20/1992  Lats Latvian ruble (rublis) at the beginning, 
gradually replaced by lats (from March 1993) 
Lithuania 10/01/1992  Litas Talonas at the beginning, replaced in June 1993 
by litas; currency board from April 1994, with 
peg to US $ 
Ukraine  11/11/1992  Karbovanets New currency unit hryvna is under discussion 
Belarus November  1992  Belarusian 
ruble
Russian ruble was accepted also after this date; 
unsucessful attempt to make monetary union 
with Russia in spring 1994 
Kyrgyzstan 05/15/1993 Som
Georgia 08/02/1993  Coupon
Turkmenistan 11/01/1993  Manat
Kazakhstan 11/15/1993  Tenge
Uzbekistan 11/16/1993 Sum
Armenia 11/22/1993  Dram
Moldova 11/29/1993  Leu
Azerbeijan 12/11/1993  Manat
Tadjikistan May  1995 
 
Sources: IMF [1994] - Annex 3; author’s data M. Dąbrowski 
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Table 2: Financial transfers from Russia to other FSU countries in 1992 (in billions of rubles) 
   
Country Technical  credits  Cash 
  1992 total  % of GDP  2nd half, 1992 
Ukraine  454.59 3.03 data not available 
Belarus 86.68 0.58 10.54 
Kazakhstan 289.06 1.93 101.19 
Uzbekistan 177.56 1.18 99.87 
Tajikistan 28.27 0.19 7.30 
Turkmenistan 80.81 0.54 53.47 
Kyrgyzstan 21.93 0.15 17.48 
Moldova 13.70 0.09 13.17 
Armenia 24.22 0.16 11.42 
Azerbaijan 43.12 0.29 5.60 
Georgia 33.04 0.22 32.46 
Latvia 1.17 0.01 - 
Lithuania -  0.44 0.00 - 
Estonia 3.66 0.02 - 
Total 1257.97 8.39 352.50 
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Ratio      
3 : 4 
1 2  3  4  5 
1992, of which:  1258.0 411.8 1669.8 24.7 
First half  316.4 59.3 375.7 15.8 
Second half  941.6 352.5 1294.1 27.2 
1993, first half, 
of which: 
932.0 1260.4 2192.4 57.5 
First quarter  660.0 460.4 1120.0 41.1 
Second quarter  272.0 800.0 1072.0 74.6 
Total 2190.0 1672.2 3862.2 43.3 
Source: Granville and Lushin [1993] 
   
 
Table 4: CBRF credits to FSU countries in comparison with 
other sources of monetary expansion, 1992-1993 (in % of GDP). 
Item 1992  1993 
Credit to government  14.2 6.4
Credit to commercial banks  14.2 4.4
Credit to other institutions  0.2 0.1
Credit to FSU countries  8.2 3.0
Total 36.8 13.9
Source: IEA [1995], pp. 210-211 
   
 M. Dąbrowski 
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Table 5: Russian financial assistance to other FSU states 
(as % of GDP of particular states) 
   
Country  1992  First 7 months 











Source: Illarionov (1993) 
   